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NOTES
only the latter,, since the former are specifically excepted under
the terms of the statute. This distinction is not justified by
any meritorious policy consideration. Moreover, the absence
of the initial object requirement would mean that a good faith
union attempting to comply with 8 (b) (7) (C) would be required
to guess when picketing acquired a recognitional object in order
to file a representation petition within the thirty-day limita-
tion. On the other hand, under the present rule, employer and
employees are amply protected from unwanted recognitional
picketing. Whenever the addition of a sufficient number of
permanent non-union replacements for economic strikers raises
a representation question involving the union's majority, they
need only file a petition for a decertification election to resolve
the issue. If the union is decertified, then under the decision
in Lawrence, 8 (b) (7) (B) would be applicable, and further post-
election picketing would be prohibited. . A literal application of
8 (b) (7) (C) would work substantial hardship on a union engaged
in a lawful economic strike, in the teeth of Congressman Grif-
fin's assurance that there was no intent to impair that right
with the enactment of 8 (b) (7).
William C. Kaufman III
RES IPSA LOQUITUR-BURDEN OF PROOF-APPLICABILITY
IN ELECTRICITY CASES
Plaintiff, manager of a cotton gin, noticed the lights in the
gin flickering. While attempting to turn off all electric power
at the fuse box, he received an electrical shock. When' he stag-
gered out of the building, defendant's power cable serving the
gin broke and fell to the ground, causing flash burns to his eyes.
Held, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, and "the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the accident was
caused by something for which it is not responsible."' Since de-
fendant failed to meet this burden, judgment for plaintiff was
upheld. Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 191 So. 2d 338
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
In the majority of American jurisdictions, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is nothing more than a rule of circumstantial
evidence. In a situation where the doctrine is properly applied,




the mere occurrence of an accident is so indicative of defendant's
negligence that one may reasonably infer negligence from the
accident. The main justification for the doctrine is the avail-
ability to defendant of the motion for a directed verdict in cases
involving a jury trial. That is, in common law jurisdictions, if
res ipsa applies, the question of negligence automatically goes
to the jury for consideration, and a refusal of defendent's motion
for a directed verdict at the completion of plaintiff's evidence
will be refused.2 Defendant still has an opportunity to present
his evidence. After he does so, the jury determines whether the
inference of negligence preponderates over the evidence which
the defendant presented. Even if the defendant chooses to rest
his case without presenting any evidence, a verdict for the
plaintiff is not mandatory. The jury still must determine
whether the inference of negligence is sufficient to prove negli-
gence. Thus, there is no "shift in the burden of proof" to de-
fendant.3
Professor Prosser states that the usual requirements neces-
sary for the application of res ipsa loquitur are: "(1) the event
must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant;
(3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contri-
bution on the part of the plaintiff. Some courts have at least
suggested a fourth, consideration, that evidence as to the true
explanation of the event must be more readily accessible to the
defendant than to the plaintiff. '4
Although the desirability of applying res ipsa loquitur in
2. See PROSSER, TORTS § 40 (3d ed. 1954) ; Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and
Proof by Inference, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 84 (1941).
3. RESTATEMENT 2d, TORTS § 32SD (1965) states: "(1) It may be inferred
that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence of the defendant when
"(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence;
"(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence, and
"(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff.
"(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may
reasonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn.
"(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to
be drawn in any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached."
See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 40 (3d ed. 1964) ; Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur
and Proof by Inference, 4 LA. L. REv. 70, 85 (1941). Burden of proof as here
used denotes "the burden of ultimately persuading the trier" of fact. See Malone,
id. at 88.
4. PROSSER, ToRTS § 39, at 218 (3d ed. 1964). Compare RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) TORTS § 328D (1965), quoted supra note 3.
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Louisiana has been questioned, 5 the doctrine is firmly imbedded
in our jurisprudence. Of much more importance are the condi-
tions Louisiana courts have found necessary for the application
of the doctrine. Frequently quoted on this point is Northwestern
Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Allain,6 which listed them as: (1) "if the
accident which damaged the plaintiff was caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the actual or constructive control of
the defendant," (2) "if the accident is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of negligence," and (3) "if the
evidence as to the true nature of the accident is more readily
accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff."7 Although
the decisions are not uniform," it is believed that this is an ac-
curate statement of Louisiana's conditions.
It is not certain whether any "burden of proof" shifts after
the application of res ipsa loquitur in Louisiana. Prosser states
that Louisiana follows the minority view of giving res ipsa loqui-
tur the effect of shifting "to the defendant the ultimate burden
of proof, requiring him to introduce evidence of greater weight
than that of the plaintiff."9  In 1941, Professor Malone, ex-
pressing a contrary view, felt Louisiana courts were using "bur-
den of proof" language "to convey the idea that the plaintiff's
claim will not be dismissed solely on the ground of inadequacy
of his own proof without reference to the defendant's explana-
tion." He further explains: "This amounts merely to saying
that the defendant's explanations, as well as the plaintiff's show-
ing, enters into a composite picture upon which judgment must
be pronounced. In other words proof of the accident affords
some inferential proof of negligence; how strong the inference
ultimately will prove to be depends in some measure upon the
plausibility of the explanation made by the defendant."'10 Chief
Justice Fournet's discussion of the procedural effects of res ipsa
5. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference, 4 LA, L. REV. 70, 84
(1941). See also Morrow, An Approach to the Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 10 LA. L. REV. 59, 67 (1949).
6. 226 La. 788, 77 So. 2d 395 (1954).
7. Id. at 794, 77 So. 2d at 397.
8. Some cases require an absence of direct evidence as to the cause of the
accident. See Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660
(1961) ; Bourg v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 77 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954)
Storey v. Parker, 13 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
In certain types of cases, "exclusive or constructive control by the defendant"
is excepted as a condition. Saunders v. Walker, 229 La. 426, 86 So. 2d 89 (1956)
Plunkett v. United States Electric Serv., 214 La. 145, 36 So. 2d 704 (1948)
Hake v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 210 La. 810, 28 So. 2d 441 (1946).
9. PsossER, TORTS § 40, at 234 (3d ed. 1964).
10. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference, 4 LA. L. REV. 70,
90 (1941).
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loquitur in Larkin v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.," a 1957
case, seems to settle the question by making it clear that plaintiff
must still prove his case by a preponderance of evidence. Res
ipsa loquitur allows him nothing more than an "inference of
negligence" which goes on the scales along with his other ev-
idence. However, a number of subsequent court of appeal cases
have continued to state that the burden of proof shifts to de-
fendant.
12
It is submitted that three aspects of the instant case are ques-
tionable. First is the court's finding that the power cable was
under the exclusive control of the defendant at the time of the
accident. As Judge Hood pointed out in his dissent,13 although
defendant had contracted to supply the gin company with power
to a maximum of 30 kilowatts, the latter, shortly before the ac-
cident and without notifying defendant, employed its own elec-
tricians to rewire the gin and installed additional electric equip-
ment, causing the average demand at the gin to rise to 68 kilo-
watts. The sudden increase could easily have caused the line to
break because of overloading. It is submitted that the gin com-
pany's action deprived the defendant of any "exclusive, or con-
structive control" it may have had.
Second is the court's language concerning the procedural ef-
11. 233 La. 544, 551, 97 So. 2d 389, 391 (1957) : "It is generally conceded
that res ipsa loquitur in no way modifies the rule that negligence will not be
presumed. The application of the rule does not, therefore, dispense with the neces-
sity that the plaintiff prove negligence, but is simply a step in the process of
such proof, permitting the plaintiff, in a proper case, to place in the scales, along
with proof of the accident and enough of the attending circumstances to invoke
the rule, an inference of negligence, thereby obtaining an advantage and placing
on the defendant the burden of going forward with proof to offset the advantage.
When all the evidence is in, the question i8'8till whether the preponderance is with
the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that there is a distinction between the "placing on the de-
fendant the burden of going forward with proof" referred to by the court and
the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant. In the first, the burden
of persuading the trier of fact remains with plaintiff. But plaintiff has offered
a piece of evidence from which negligence may be inferred, namely, the occurrence
of the accident. A defendant not wanting to allow the scales to remain tilted
against him must step forward to rebut the inference.
In the second, the burden of persuading the trier of fact shifts to defendant.
If the trier of fact is at a point of indecision at the completion of the case, it
will decide in favor of plaintiff. See Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by
Inference, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 87-91 (1941).
12. Gabriel v. Royal Prod. Div. of Wash. Prod., 159 So. 2d 384 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964); Bougon v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 535 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962); Johnson v. Johness, 145 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ;
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Herrin Transp. Co., 136 So. 2d 272 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1961); Steadman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 113 So. 2d 489 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1959).
13. Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 191 So. 2d 338, 344 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966).
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fect of the application of res ipsa loquitur. The court stated:
"Having determined that the doctrine applies, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to show that the accident was
caused by something for which he is not responsible."'1 4  As
previously discussed, this is not consistent with the majority
position in other American jurisdictions and relatively recent
expressions by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Larkin v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.' 5 Although much is said in Louisiana
cases about shifting the "burden of proof," it is submitted that
it is of little practical importance today. In the usual res ipsa
loquitur case plaintiff offers as evidence of defendant's negli-
gence more than the mere occurrence of the accident, which is
countered with evidence to the contrary by defendant. When the
judge is finally called upon to make his determination, the ques-
tion of burden of proof enters his consideration only if he finds
it impossible to say which party offered stronger evidence sup-
porting his contentions. Only then would he be forced to decide
against the party carrying the burden of proof. Practically
speaking, such is seldom the case.
Third is the courts' application of res ipsa loquitur in cases
where electricity caused the injury. In the majority of Lou-
isiana cases dealing with the subject, res ipsa loquitur is not
mentioned. The doctrine was applied in only two previous
cases.' 6 In each the court found for the plaintiff, but was care-
ful to point out specific acts of negligence by defendant.'7 The
courts' usual approach is to consider that one who handles power-
14. Id. at 341.
15. See note 11 supra.
16. Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, Light & Waterworks Co., 111 La. 522, 35
So. 731 (1903) ; Ledet v. Lockport Light & Power Co., 15 La. App. 426, 132
So. 272 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931). For electricity cases finding res ipsa inap-
plicable, see Kemra Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 132 So. 2d 688
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (instrumentality not under defendant's control) ; Bou-
dreaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 135 So. 90 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931)
(there was presence of direct evidence and a reasonable inference of negligence could
not be drawn).
17. As Judge Hood pointed out in the dissent: "In the Hebert Case . . . the
court found that the defendant was negligent in maintaining high voltage wire
.,without proper insulation.' In the Ledet case, the court found that the defendant
was negligent in failing to equip its electric wires with 'an efficient safety device,
one that would work, cut off the power and render the wire harmless in case
it broke and fell.'" Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light Go., 191 So. 2d 338,
343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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ful currents of electricity is under a duty of exercising utmost
care and prudence consistent with the practical operation of its
facility, and that more evidence than the mere occurrence of an
accident is required to prove negligence.' 8
James E. Bolin, Jr.
18. Calton v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 56 So. 2d 862, affirmed 222 La.
1063, 64 So. 2d 432 (1953) ; Hughes v. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., 175 La. 336,
143 So. 281 (1932); Mays v. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., 174 La. 368, 140
So. 826 (1932) ; Potts v. Shreveport Belt Ry., 110 La. 1, 34 So. 103 (1903);
Coulon v. City of Alexandria, 44 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) ; Short v.
Central La. Elec. Co., 36 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; McMullen v. Mc-
Clunney, 2.3 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) ; Scott v. Claiborne Elec. Co-op.,
13 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) Webb v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
199 So. 451 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940); Bynum v. City of Monroe, 171 So. 116
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1936) ; Freibert v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans,
159 So. 767 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935) ; Younse v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper
Co., 159 So. 611 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
